What does it mean to have a nature, an essence? Am I a bundle or a concrete particular with a certain set of properties? Well, I don’t fancy myself a bundle, and Nominalism in general seems false to me. I have written papers where I defend a substance view of humans, Substance Dualism (in a Thomistic sense, not Cartesian). However, I must confess that I would rather not believe in various bits of metaphysical realism such as abstract objects. Also, I am especially bothered by the fact that the property of Red, may not itself be Red. That just seems strange.
On the other hand, it seems right to me that the essential nature of a fish is to be in water. The problem of being a “fish out of water” is obvious and persuasive to me. No matter what anyone else might say, fish are supposed to be in water. That seems objectively clear, and NOT a matter of convention to me. Even those fish (if there are more than one KIND) that can survive outside of what for short periods of time are still generally supposed to be in the water. If this were not the case, we should be tempted to think of classifying the air loving fish as an amphibian or something all together different.
Furthermore, it seems right to me that I have a nature. I might even do things that go against my nature. For example, those childhood times where I have tried to fly have contributed to my overall sense of bodily discomfort presently. I think most people would agree to this generally.
However, the problems come quickly because the argument from nature is often used to defend various moral claims. An interesting spilt on this issue is homosexuality. Some want to appeal to nature (in a “thin sense”) and claim that homosexuality is simply determined by our genes. (I will not comment on the merit of this scientific evidence at this time). One’s nature (thinly) determines our sexual preference, it is argued, so they cannot be morally blame worthy for homosexuality. Now, what I, as a proponent of libertarian freedom, don’t like things that suggest that I did not choose. I occasionally entertain the thought I may have had influence on who my parents were to be. Granted, there are some things that in the end I must admit I cannot control about myself (e.g. what beliefs I directly choose, my parents, feelings, etc.). But I don’t have to like it.
On the other hand, others will claim that the human essence is by nature (thick, metaphysical sense) not supposed to be homosexual. Those who make this claim in a think sense are speaking much more deeply than referring to “plumbing.” The problem here is possibly my lack of information or possibly epistemic support. My question is “what is exactly are you ‘looking’ at to make such a judgment about natures?”
I am planning on finding out, about natures and who is looking at what. I want to know who is right, why she is right, and how does she know. What do you think? And what bothers you about your view?
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2 comments:
What do you think of the Aristotelean suggestion that we, as a community, look to the habits of human persons who are living happy, flourishing lives, and say they are fulfilling their teleology? (I'm assuming that our nature and our telos are closely related.) Of course this implicitly assumes that we are able to (justifiably/warrantedly) determine those habits and happiness, but it doesn't seem like critics are attacking that, so much as the project itself. This methodology could also be expanded to include the "habits" (laws and shared moral practices) of disparate cultures and times to increase our scope (since we're discussing human nature writ large).
It might also be helpful to note that the idea of human nature may have more applications, with regards to issues of human rights, inherent dignity, and moral responsibility. I think most of us want to be able to confidently assert that "so-and-so has a right to such-and-such,"e.g. "John has a right to not be raped" or "Mary has a right to express herself." (Feel free to rephrase to whatever moral framework is preferred.) But if those rights are somehow based in what John and Mary share, a human nature, then some framework for determining what is appropriate to human nature is assumed, and any skepticism towards that nature (either in its existence or in our ability to make determinations from it) may well threaten some other important moral claims.
First, I agree with the "Aristotelean suggestion" at least in terms of the broad sense of our aims and being in accord with our "telos" results in happiness.. The difficulty is how deep the metaphyical framework is. This is to say, is my "telos" determined strictly by my internal structure OR not(enter your assumption that we determine)? If we determine these things, we might do so in a limited or degreed fashion, which in turn brings about new issues. For example, maybe it is determined biologically that I am a sexual being, but how this is manifested is entirely up to me, or somewhat up to me. And in each case I MIGHT be working WITH/TOWARD my "telos" or AGAINST/AWAY from it. I am leaving out the important MORAL discussion that is relevant.
It seems that most philosophers are trying to keep the metaphysics out of various ethical systems, except for those hold outs.
Second, I am probably a reluctant hold out. My reluctancy is mostly because I simply don't like abtract objects. The problem is without them I end up being a kind of nominalist, which I want to reject on other grounds. John and Mary are may problem: 1) IF I fully buy into the Aristotelean picture (as I currently understand it), most of my problems are solved. There is morality, and natures, etc. The problem is that in buy this option wholesale it seems to me that I either naturalize the universe (and have an unacceptable deistic god) or I nominalize it getting rid of abstract objects (attractive) BUT loosing the many in the one... and possibly re-entering the problem of abosultes again.
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